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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews some of the main issues with intergovernmental transfers in Latin 
America. The analysis is set against the backdrop of the basic normative principles 
of revenue assignments and the practice of sub-national government financing in the 
region. Own revenue collections and an equalization transfer program are key 
components of a sound sub-national fiscal structure. However, in most Latin 
American countries own revenue collections represent a minor share of sub-national 
revenues and equalization programs, if present, are generally not properly designed. 
Instead, sub-national finances in the region heavily rely on revenue sharing schemes 
with often multiple and unclear objectives and with negative effects on equity and 
economic efficiency. In this paper we provide a critical analysis of those revenue 
sharing schemes utilized in Latin America, and propose an alternative approach to 
the structuring of the transfer systems and more generally of the sub-national 
revenue systems in the region. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of Latin American countries have now accumulated several decades of experience 
with fiscal decentralization reforms. Although considerable progress has been made in many 
fronts, that experience has not helped to avoid some serious common pitfalls in the assignment of 
revenue sources to sub-national governments in the region.
1
 Sub-national finances in Latin 
America are generally characterized by relatively small shares of own revenue collections and 
non-existing or –with some rare exceptions– poorly designed equalization transfer programs.2 In 
this paper we argue that the use (and abuse) of revenue sharing schemes in the region has 
prevented the development of sound financial structures at the sub-national level.  
The comparative advantages of sub-national governments with respect to the central 
government are usually concentrated in the expenditure side of the budget. Because of this 
reason, expenditure decentralization is usually more pervasive than revenue decentralization, and 
intergovernmental transfers are called to play a crucial role in the fiscal balance of almost all 
fiscally decentralized systems. The main challenge for an intergovernmental transfer system is 
the computing and timely delivery of the right amount of transfers to each sub-national 
government. Failing to do this well can result in setting the wrong signals regarding the efficient 
level of public expenditures at the sub-national level, and therefore end eroding the efficiency 
gains expected from the decentralization process itself. These are, in our opinion, some of the 
risks currently faced by many Latin American countries. Their heavy reliance on revenue sharing 
schemes and the lack of clarity about the role and proper composition of the transfer system has 
led in many cases to an inefficient distribution of revenues combined with significant horizontal 
fiscal imbalances.  
The situation has not been helped by the fact that the academic literature does not provide 
definite advice about what the optimal composition of sub-national revenues should be. In 
particular, the current academic literature does not provide concrete guidance on how revenue 
sharing schemes should be combined with other transfer programs to achieve more optimal 
revenue assignments.  
In this paper we take on these topics. One of our main conclusions is that revenue sharing 
schemes should be limited to finance only those expenditure functions where sub-national 
governments do not enjoy any significant degree of discretion. In contrast, those functions where 
sub-national governments do enjoy a significant degree of discretion should be financed 
primarily by own revenues and carefully designed equalization transfers.  
                                                          
1
 We follow a common practice in the literature and use the term “sub-national” to refer all government units under 
the central (or national) level. We distinguish two sub-national levels of government: The intermediate or regional 
level, which in Latin America may also be said to consist of states, departments or provinces; and the local or 
municipal level. 
2
 The little importance of own revenues and the absence of equalization transfers might have a common origin. In 
particular, heavier reliance on own revenues typically come together with great disparities in the economic base and 
thus make the introduction of an equalization transfer programs much more necessary. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an overview 
of the main principles to be considered in the design of sub-national financial structure, paying 
particular attention to revenue sharing schemes. In section three we review the characteristics of 
Latin-American transfer systems; we highlight the most common patterns in the region and 
evaluate their performance. In section four we propose a simple framework for the redesign of 
the system of intergovernmental transfers in the region. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The Role of Intergovernmental Transfers in Fiscally 
Decentralized Systems 
The classic economic justification for fiscal decentralization is due to Oates (1972), and focuses 
on the comparative advantages of sub-national governments to determine the optimal provision 
of public goods within their jurisdiction. He argued that if preferences are not homogeneous 
across jurisdictions and sub-national governments are capable of providing goods and services 
efficiently, then allowing for the expenditures decisions to be made “closer to the people” would 
result in a better fit of each jurisdiction‟s preferences and therefore in welfare gains for society.3 
This argument translates into the so called “subsidiarity principle,” by which an expenditure 
responsibility should be assigned to the lowest level of government capable of efficiently 
providing that function. Those services with spillover benefits beyond singe jurisdictions should 
be provided by higher levels of government. In general, there seems to be agreement about what 
are the expenditure responsibilities that should be assigned to sub-national governments, and in 
practice most countries around the world decentralize similar expenditure functions.
4
 
On the revenue side of the budget, however, both the debate and the practice of fiscal 
decentralization reforms are far from having reached consensus. In order to devolve effective 
decision making powers and promote efficient expenditure choices at the sub-national level, it is 
generally accepted that it is necessary to ensure some degree of revenue autonomy. Revenue 
autonomy is also important because it enhances the accountability of government officials and 
citizens‟ participation. The problem lies in that revenue autonomy is also related with important 
efficiency costs. The presence of economies of scale in tax administration, collections and 
enforcement usually implies that the sub-national governments are less effective than the central 
government in raising a given amount of revenues for most tax instruments. After weighting 
benefits and costs of own revenue collections, it is generally efficient to provide less than full 
                                                          
3
 Oates (1999, 2006) offer updated discussions about the gains and challenges of fiscal decentralization reforms. 
4
 McLure and Martinez-Vazquez. (2004) and Shah (2004) provide overviews on the international practices in 
expenditure assignments. 
4                                                      International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
budgetary autonomy at the sub-national level, thus decentralizing revenue sources in amounts 
that are insufficient to cover all sub-national expenditures.
5
 
The overall asymmetric decentralization of expenditure responsibilities and revenue 
sources leads to fiscal disparities, roughly defined as the difference between the costs of 
providing the goods and services that a government is responsible for and the revenue that the 
same government is able to gather from its assigned revenue sources. The magnitude of fiscal 
disparities varies across different levels of government and among governments at the same 
level, creating what are known as vertical and horizontal imbalances, respectively. In terms of 
vertical imbalance the central government typically exhibits a negative fiscal disparity, whose 
absolute value is (by definition) equal to the sum of all fiscal disparities at the sub-national level. 
In addition, horizontal imbalances are also common because governments of the same level 
normally face dissimilar economic conditions, including the costs of public service delivery, the 
needs of different population groups, the size and elasticity of tax bases, and so on. Reducing 
vertical and horizontal imbalances necessarily requires the use of intergovernmental transfers, 
which thus become a fundamental component of any well functioning fiscally decentralized 
system of government. 
Although there is wide consensus among scholars and policymakers that own source 
revenues and intergovernmental transfers are both indispensable sources of sub-national finance; 
there are no clear guidelines regarding their optimal combination.
6
 The academic literature 
stresses the importance of own revenue collections at the sub-national level, but the exact extent 
of own revenue collections is not precisely defined.
7
 In the following discussion we provide 
some principles to be considered for the design of an efficient structure of sub-national revenues. 
 
Towards a normative prescription for optimal (sub-national) 
revenue structure 
A widely accepted principle of fiscal decentralization design states that “finance follows 
function.” This principle emphasizes that both the amount of revenues required by a government 
as well as the adequate choice of its revenue sources depend on the specific characteristics of the 
assigned expenditure responsibilities and the cost of financing them.
8
 Although there are many 
ways to categorize expenditure assignments to sub-national governments, an essential distinction 
                                                          
5
 Another important aspect to be considered is the decentralization of tax administration. Local government 
accountability may be enhanced when local governments administer and enforce their own taxes (Martinez-Vazquez 
and Timofeev, 2010) 
6
 Sub-national borrowings are an additional financial source for sub-national governments, but in practice few 
countries, most of them developed, have been able to extend successfully the use of financial debt among sub-
national governments. In developing countries it is common to observe that only the capital and few other large 
municipalities have gained access to private credit markets.  
7
 Some general rules of thumb have been provided. One is that autonomous revenues should be sufficient to finance 
the expenditure responsibilities of the richest sub-national governments. In the following discussion we will see that 
even though it can be a good approximation, this can fall short of typifying an optimal assignment of revenues.  
8
 See, for example, Bahl (1999). 
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is whether: (i) the assignments correspond to own sub-national responsibilities, which explicitly 
call or rely on discretionary decisions made by sub-national governments; or (ii) they correspond 
to responsibilities that have been delegated to the sub-national governments by the central 
government, which fundamentally involve non-discretionary decisions by sub-national 
governments. Note that, strictly speaking, sub-national autonomy is required if and only if an 
expenditure function has been assigned as an exclusive or own responsibility to the sub-national 
level. In contrast, even though delegated functions are implemented by sub-national 
governments, the ultimate responsibility over these functions may be interpreted as falling upon 
the central government. So discretion, if allowed, could only be exerted within certain limits and 
controls. Frequent examples of delegated expenditure responsibilities are education and health 
services. Service delivery in these sectors is normally assigned to sub-national governments, and 
regardless whether or not the distinction is made in the law between own and delegated, 
significant shares of the sub-national education and health budgets are devoted to meet national 
standards regarding quality and coverage. In contrast, service delivery, for example, for street 
cleaning and lighting, whether or not the laws make the distinction between own and delegated 
responsibilities, generally are associated with decisions that are fully discretionary at the sub-
national level.  
Figure 1 illustrates the ideal correspondence between sub-national expenditures, divided 
in discretionary and non-discretionary categories, and sub-national revenues. Assuming for 
expositional purposes and convenience that there are no savings, sub-national revenues must be 
equal to sub-national expenditures. The presence of a vertical imbalance typically implies that 
sub-national expenditures are larger than sub-national own revenue collections, and in order to 
eliminate this vertical imbalance the central government must provide additional resources in the 
form of intergovernmental transfers.
9
 
Non-discretionary (delegated) expenditure responsibilities should be primarily financed, 
as it is conventionally accepted, by conditional intergovernmental transfers. If the central 
government is committed with achieving certain national standards then it should provide the 
funds required to ensure that those standards are met nationwide. Intergovernmental transfers are 
also necessary to finance own sub-national responsibilities, but this financing must be 
unconditional in order to allow for discretionary sub-national decisions. 
Revenue sharing is a particular type of intergovernmental transfers in which a 
predetermined proportion of central government collections from one or more tax instruments is 
set aside and distributed either in a derivation basis of by formula among sub-national 
governments. This arrangement exploits the central government‟s advantage in tax collection 
Figure 1. Basic structure of sub-national governments‟ budget  
                                                          
9
 Estimating the size of the vertical imbalance is a complex task. As argued in Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2010), any 
estimation of the vertical imbalances requires, among other things, an explicit methodology for estimating 
expenditure needs (corresponding to the current expenditure assignments) and estimates of own revenue capacity 
and all types of transfers. In practice, the decision about the actual amount of intergovernmental transfers tends to 
rests more on political than technical considerations (Bird and Tarasov, 2004). 
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while allowing sub-national governments to gain access to buoyant revenue sources and 
minimizing distortions due to uncoordinated tax administration and tax competition (Rao, 2007). 
Revenue sharing schemes are widely used in the world and represent a significant share of 
intergovernmental transfers in most Latin American countries. In part, this is because they are 
considered an adequate means of providing greater revenue autonomy to sub-national 
government. Sometimes, due to a certain perception of entitlement, revenues shared in a 
derivation basis are (wrongly) labeled as sub-national “own” revenues.10 
Even though revenue sharing and other intergovernmental transfers are an important 
source of sub-national revenues in many countries, unfortunately the literature has not yet 
provided clear normative prescriptions regarding the extent to which sub-national finances 
should rely on these revenue sources. The conventional decentralization theory only states that 
sub-national governments should be able to control the level of revenues at the margin (McLure, 
2000); but autonomy at the margin refers only to the ability to alter the amount of own revenue 
collections and says nothing about the revenue structure.  
In particular, the existing literature has not properly emphasized the fact that 
intergovernmental transfers are costless from the recipient governments‟ perspective, which 
means that they may not provide adequate information about the marginal cost of public funds. 
The marginal costs of public funds include the marginal costs of administering and collecting 
additional revenues as well as their social welfare costs, and they indicate the (minimum) level of 
marginal benefits required for the last unit of public expenditures to be economically desirable. 
                                                          
10
 Strictly speaking, the label of “own” revenues should be reserved for those taxes for which sub-national 
governments have some control over the rates or the tax base; or at least over the final amount of revenue 
collections. By definition, all forms of revenue sharing are excluded from that category. 
Revenue   
sharing  
Sub-national 
expenditures 
Sub-national 
revenues 
Own SNGs 
revenues 
Equalization 
transfers  
Non-discretionary 
decisions  
(on “delegated” 
responsibilities) 
Discretionary  
decisions  
(on “own”    
responsibilities) 
Conditional 
transfers 
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Intergovernmental transfer substitute away own tax revenues (and financial debt), and since the 
marginal cost of public funds usually increases with the amount of own revenues, then the 
marginal cost perceived by the sub-national governments can be expected to decrease with the 
level of intergovernmental transfers, and at any rate not to match the actual marginal cost.
11
  
Efficient autonomous decisions in both public expenditures and own revenues collections 
require a government to be faced with a correct measure (or at least a close approximation) of the 
marginal costs of public funds, and aligning the marginal cost of funds is one of the main 
objectives of the intergovernmental transfers.
12
 As Bird and Smart (2002, 899) put it, “(t)he basic 
task in transfer design is to get prices „right‟ in the public sector.”  
Although not readily obvious, the objective of aligning the prices faced by sub-national 
governments is entirely compatible with the traditional objectives reserved for an equalization 
transfer program. Equalization transfer programs are meant to reduce differences on the ability of 
sub-national governments of the same level to cover the cost of providing a standard package of 
public goods and services.
13
 In this context, the “right” marginal cost of public funds correspond 
to that level at which sub-national governments collect the revenues required to finance the 
standard package of public goods and services. In this sense, an equalization transfer program 
can serve to provide to the sub-national governments with the conditions required to make 
efficient autonomous decisions. Of course, the greater the equalization transfer fund is the 
greater the room to effectively equalize sub-national fiscal conditions.  
We must note that besides the equalization transfers there is no need for additional 
transfer programs aimed to fostering decision making autonomy at the sub-national levels of 
government. Moreover, in order to ensure that the equalization transfer program can effectively 
reach its objective, it would be desirable not to allow the sum of conditional transfers and 
revenues shared on a derivation basis to exceed the amount of expenditures needed for delegated 
or non-discretionary functions (Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda, 2010). This condition should 
hold not only for each level of sub-national governments taken as a whole, but also for each sub-
national government. Complementarily, discretionary expenditure responsibilities should be 
financed primarily via own revenue collections and equalization transfers, which can jointly 
inform sub-national policy makers about the correct level of the marginal cost of public funds.  
 
                                                          
11
 In the same line, Smart (1998) argues that (equalization) transfers reduce the marginal cost of funds for sub-
national governments.  
12
 According to optimal taxation theory, sub-national revenues should be assigned in such a way that the marginal 
cost of public funds is equalized across levels of government and governments of the same level. See, for instance, 
Dahlby and Wilson (1994). 
13
 In section 4 we discuss the objectives and design of equalization transfer programs in more detail. 
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3. Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America 
Even though most Latin American countries have been engaged in lengthy fiscal decentralization 
processes, sub-national revenue autonomy is still limited. Revenues collected by regional and 
local governments in the region frequently represent a small fraction of their revenues and in the 
few cases where they represent a sizable share of local budgets, generally they are not especially 
important in the national context. Table 1 shows the share of own tax collections over total 
revenues at the local and regional levels in a group of Latin American countries, as well as the 
relative importance of the two levels of government in terms of the distribution of revenues in 
the public sector. All local governments in the sample collect less than 50 percent of their own 
revenues. Chilean municipalities display the greatest share of own tax collections, but in that 
case revenue autonomy is tempered by the limited extent of the fiscal decentralization process in 
that country. At the regional level the experience is mixed. The Argentine provinces collect a 
significant share of their revenues through turnover, stamp and property taxes, and the 
Colombian departments are able to raise some revenues from excise taxes. In other countries like 
Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru, however, regional governments collect few or no taxes. 
 
Table 1. Share of own taxes and fees on local revenues in 10 Latin American countries 
 Local governments Regional governments 
Country (year) 
share of  
own tax collections 
on local revenues 
share of local 
revenues on general 
gov. revenues 
share of  
own tax collections 
on regional revenues 
share of regional 
revenues on general 
gov. revenues 
Argentina  2.0% 8.4% 68.9% 
a
 16.6% 
 (2004) (2004) (2004) (2008) 
Bolivia 
b
 17.2% 23.3% 0.0% 21.0% 
 (2007) (2007) (2007) (2007) 
Brazil 
c
 20.1% 
c
 9.0% -- 
d
 34.8% 
 (2007) (2007)  (2008) 
Chile  48.1% 9.6% -- -- 
 (2006) (2006)   
Colombia  
e
 34.8% 22.9% 
e
 27.7% 17.6% 
 (2008) (2003) (2008) (2003) 
Costa Rica  36.2% 5.9% -- -- 
 (2006) (2006)   
Ecuador 
c
 34.6% 12.0% -- -- 
 (2007) (2007)   
Mexico  
c
 15.6% 
c
 6.0% 
f
 2.7% 
f
 40.6% 
 (2007) (2007) (2006) (2006) 
Paraguay  41.3% 6.2% 0.0% 2.1% 
 (2006) (2006) (2006) (2006) 
Peru  10.8% 13.7% 0.0% 19.0% 
 (2005) (2005) (2005) (2005) 
Sources (and notes): Government Finance Statistics (Sept. 2010), 
a
 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, 
Argentina (considers only tax revenues), 
b
 Zapata (2007), 
c
 Martinez-Vazquez (2010), 
d
 National Treasure of Brazil, 
e
 Direccion Nacional de Panificacion (Colombia) and 
f
 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (Mexico, 2009). 
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This evidence suggests that most countries in the region suffer from significant vertical 
imbalances and a high level of dependency on intergovernmental transfers from the central 
government.
14
 In order to address these problems all countries in the region are currently 
implementing a variety of intergovernmental transfers programs. In the following discussion we 
provide an overview of Latin American transfer systems, and then we examine the possible 
equalizing and efficiency effects of the main transfer programs. 
 
3.1  Current practices in transfer design in Latin America 15 
Given the great diversity of intergovernmental transfer programs observed in Latin America it is 
difficult to describe common strategies and approaches to address the problem of vertical 
imbalances. Programs vary widely in terms of their funding rules, the distribution mechanisms 
and the conditions imposed on their use. In part, these variations respond to the different 
objective to be accomplished, but it is also common in the region to observe programs where 
there is no clear correspondence between design and objective, or where there are two or more 
rather incompatible objectives. 
Examples of well designed and effective transfer programs can be found among the 
numerous conditional transfer programs implemented in the region. The use of this type of 
transfers in Latin America is not as extensive as in other regions of the world, but still a 
significant share of sub-national revenues is subject to one or more conditions. In general, they 
are especially effective in facilitating the fulfillment of (minimum) national standards of services 
and in increasing the delivery of services with positive externalities. Most countries have sizable 
transfer programs earmarked to either capital expenditures or to important sub-national functions 
like education and health. For example, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Paraguay provide 
examples of capital transfers to local governments; El Salvador and Peru are cases where the 
municipal governments compete for the capital transfers through project proposals. In Brazil 
conditional transfers for education and health are directed first to the states, primary responsible 
for these functions; while in Chile the transfers for these functions are distributed directly to the 
local governments. There are also several examples of conditional transfer programs directed to 
vulnerable groups. In Bolivia, for example, there is a program (Seguro Materno Infantil) aimed 
to finance health services for infants and mothers, and in Peru a similar program (Vaso de Leche) 
covers basic nutrition needs of poor children, pregnant women and mothers.  
The funding mechanisms can be defined with independence from the conditions imposed 
to the use of the transfers. One of the most common ways to finance transfer programs in the 
region is by defining revenue sharing schemes, and there are several major conditional transfer 
                                                          
14
 Although the presence of vertical imbalances is rather obvious, their actual extent is unknown due to the lack of 
estimates of the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of the different levels of government in each country. 
15
 This section draws partially on Martinez-Vazquez (2010), who offers an exhaustive review of governments‟ 
financing practices at the local level in Latin American countries. 
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programs in the region that use this alternative.
 16
 In Colombia and Guatemala the use of revenue 
sharing funds for local governments is conditioned to basic education, health, and infrastructure 
spending; and 25 percent of revenues from hydrocarbons and mining must be spent in roughly 
the same functions in Venezuela. In addition, Nicaragua and Paraguay set a minimum proportion 
of the revenue sharing transfers received at the local level to be spent on capital infrastructure, 
and in Peru a similar rule applies to the funds received by regional governments, part of which 
can only be spent on capital investments and infrastructure maintenance.  
Given a certain amount of revenues collected from the shared sources, the most important 
effect of revenue sharing schemes is that they set, most times unambiguously, the size of the 
transfer funds. This characteristic makes revenue sharing schemes useful to provide sub-national 
governments with buoyant and predictable revenues and for the same reasons they seem to be 
very attractive in ensuring certain degree of budgetary autonomy. This is likely the reason 
explaining the popularity of revenue sharing schemes in Latin America, and why the countries in 
the region often prefer to impose no condition to the use of the most important transfer programs. 
Virtually all Latin American countries use some form of revenue sharing scheme defined 
on the basis of central government general revenues or a group of their most important taxes, 
such as the personal income tax, the value added tax and other taxes on corporate profits or sales. 
In principle, this approach can be harmless, but serious problems can arise when: (i) the bases are 
volatile; (ii) when the criteria to distribute them among sub-national governments are not related 
with relative expenditure needs; and (iii) when they represent a significant share of sub-national 
revenues. 
An important example of volatile transfers is given by those cases where the sharing 
bases are taxes on extractive industries, a situation rather common among countries with 
abundant natural resources. In Mexico, one fifth of the revenues collected by the states must be 
shared with their municipalities; tax sharing revenues for municipalities in Bolivia and Nicaragua 
are also defined over natural resources; and in Peru 50 percent of the revenues collected from the 
corporate income tax on extractive industries are shared with regional and local governments. In 
all these examples, the size of the transfers‟ pool has been subject to wide fluctuations associated 
with changes in the international prices of natural resources. 
Revenues from taxes on extractive industries can be especially distortionary when shared 
on a derivation or origin basis. For example, the sub-national share of the corporate income tax 
on gas, oil and minerals‟ extractive industries in Peru, the canon and sobrecanon, is distributed 
exclusively among the regions, provinces and municipalities where the extraction of the natural 
resources has taken place. A similar allocation arrangement is found in Bolivia, where most of 
the revenues shared go to the regions in which they are collected, but a small fraction (less than 
10 percent) is reserved for regions with no natural resources. Ecuador and Venezuela are other 
examples of countries where the revenues from extractive industries are shared in a derivation 
                                                          
16
 Jiménez and Podestá (2009) provide a comprehensive overview of intergovernmental transfer systems in Latin 
America and emphasize the volatility of the central taxes shared with sub-national governments. 
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basis. The presence of natural resources is unlikely to be correlated with the public expenditure 
needs in each jurisdiction; therefore, this allocation criterion can create severe economic 
distortions at the sub-national levels of government, as well as a perception of unfairness 
regarding the way public funds are being distributed across the country. An additional problem 
related with this type of revenues is that they might provide a strong sense of entitlement to the 
beneficiaries, who perceive them as a legitimate right that cannot be taken away. In Peru, for 
instance, the discussions about how to solve the existing horizontal fiscal disparities have only 
led to proposals requiring new funds to compensate the losers, and any reform to the distribution 
mechanism of the (already excessive) available funds is currently considered as politically 
unviable. 
Less detrimental, but not harmless, forms of sharing revenues on a derivation basis are 
defined over bases more homogeneously distributed across the national or regional territory. The 
Brazilian states, for instance, have a tax sharing scheme funded with 25 percent of their regional 
VAT revenues. From this fund, 75 percent is distributed among municipalities on a derivation 
basis, and the rest by a formula that considers population, land area and other variables.  
A much better (if not the best) way to allocate unconditional shares of revenues consists 
in using formulas that contain some equalization features. This is a quite common approach in 
Latin America, although each country seems to choose different equalizing objectives and 
implements its own combinations of funding mechanisms and distribution criteria. In Brazil the 
amount of the Federal District and State Participation Fund (FPE) and the Municipalities 
Participation Fund (FPM) are defined, respectively, as a 21.5 percent and 22.5 percent of the 
revenues collected from the three most important federal taxes (the personal income tax, the 
corporate income tax and the value added tax.) The FPE is distributed in fixed proportions 
among the five macro-regions, with the objective of reducing historical disparities. The poorest 
macro-region, the northeast, receives 52.46 percent of the fund; an additional 25.37 percent is 
allocated to the north, and the rest to the center-west, southeast and south. The FPM is 
distributed mainly in proportion to the population of each municipality, but for large 
municipalities an adjustment by per capita income is introduced. 
Equalization transfers in the region are most commonly financed by the central 
governments and distributed across sub-national governments in accordance to some proxy for 
poverty or (expenditure) needs. Examples of these programs can be found in virtually all Latin 
American countries, although they broadly differ in their design and importance on sub-national 
public finances. Of course, equalization transfer programs do not need to be financed exclusively 
by the center. An alternative approach in the region is given by the Chilean Common Municipal 
Fund, which is financed by own revenues from the richest governments and distributed among 
the rest of the municipalities with a formula that considers population, poverty and other 
variables. This financing method is known in the literature as a “fraternal” system, in contrast to 
the traditional “paternal” system in which the central government provides all the funds of the 
program. Another distinctive experience is the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
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Initiative) transfers program implemented in Bolivia, where the funds are provided by 
international organizations like the World Bank and the IMF, and distributed among local 
governments in accordance to their relative population and poverty levels. 
Equalization transfers are usually unconditional, but there are some interesting 
exemptions to this rule. The Peruvian Regional Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensacion 
Regional) and the Chilean National Fund for Regional Development (Fondo Nacional de 
Desarrollo Regional) provide funds conditioned exclusively to capital expenditures at the 
regional level, and their distribution are based on equalizing objectives with explicit 
consideration of poverty indicators. 
However, addressing horizontal disparities with a sizable transfer program exclusively 
devoted to the objective of equalization is not frequent in the region. Revenue sharing schemes 
can easily incorporate proxies for relative expenditure needs –like population and poverty ratios, 
but it is much more difficult to correct for differences in fiscal capacity.
17
 In reality, the 
equalizing mechanisms used in the region do not provide explicit estimates of expenditure needs; 
and the equalization of fiscal capacity is usually not considered in the distribution formulas. The 
problem in this case is that one monetary unit that cannot be collected is exactly equivalent to 
one monetary unit that is not available to cover expenditure needs. Thus, when fiscal capacity is 
disregarded it may simply be not possible to equalize the ability to provide comparable public 
services across the country. 
 
3.2  Critical assessment of Latin American transfer systems   
Certain common characteristics of the intergovernmental transfer systems in Latin American 
countries are peculiar in the international context. In particular, the heavy reliance on revenue 
sharing schemes and their distribution in accordance to some equalizing criteria are distinctive 
features of Latin American sub-national finances (Martinez-Vazquez, 2010). Instead of adequate 
adaptations to the regional reality, however, these arrangements suggest some degree of 
confusion regarding the role and consequences of this revenue source in a fiscally decentralized 
system of government.  
Revenue sharing schemes provide sub-national governments with predictable and usually 
buoyant revenues, but they might also be associated with important costs to the public sector and 
the economy as a whole. If the revenues shared represent a significant proportion of the public 
budget then they can be expected to reduce the ability of the central government to implement 
desirable tax and expenditures policies. One example of this situation is observed in Peru, where 
the revenues shared increased their relative importance due to greater international prices paid 
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 Higher fiscal capacity calls for fewer transfers, but implementing a downward adjustment of the transfer amounts 
can be technically challenging or politically difficult. Theoretically, there would not be any problem if the proxies 
used to account for expenditure needs are negatively (and perfectly) correlated with fiscal capacity, but that would 
be rarely the case. 
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for Peruvian natural resources. Figure 1 presents the evolution of the ratio of revenues shared 
with sub-national government over total central government tax collections. At the beginning of 
the period, in 2004, the revenues shared with regional and local governments represented only 2 
percent of the total taxes collected by the central government. When international prices reached 
their peak in 2007, however, the transfers to sub-national governments explained by revenue 
sharing schemes represented more than a 12 percent of central government tax collections. Even 
though these transfers are conditioned to be spent on capital investments, they have been quite 
effective in boosting sub-national expenditures and, as a consequence, the central government 
has seen its ability to control the growth of the public sector in the margin diminished.  
 
Figure 1. Revenues shared over central  Figure 2. Composition of intergovernmental 
government tax collections in Peru  transfers to local governments in Peru        
   
 
Revenue sharing transfers to local governments have also reduced the effectiveness of the 
FONCOMUN, the only equalization transfer program implemented at that level in Peru. Figure 2 
shows the importance of the equalization transfer program and the revenues shared in the 
transfers received by local governments. In 2004 the equalization transfer program represented 
half of the transfers received by local governments, but its importance was reduced during the 
period 2007-2009, mainly due to the increase in revenue sharing. Shared revenues were 
especially significant during 2007, and they remain the most important transfer program for both 
local and regional governments in the country. 
A peculiar characteristic of some revenue sharing schemes in Latin American is their 
multi-purpose design, which in some cases includes the equalization objective. This practice 
might help not only to avoid the creation of new horizontal inequalities, but also to improve, to 
some extent, the disparities already encountered in the region. This is a particularly relevant topic 
in Latin America, where individual and regional disparities are relatively large by international 
standards.
18
 Table 2 presents two simple measures of regional disparities in GDP per capita for 
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 Goñi et al. (2008) describe the extent of individual inequalities in the region and discusses the causes of the poor 
performance of redistributive policies. 
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five Latin American countries. Mexico has the greatest regional disparities. The ratio of per 
capita GDP between the richest state (Campeche) and the poorest state (either Oaxaca or 
Chiapas) is greater than 14 times and does not show any decreasing tendency. On the other hand, 
the coefficient of variation of per capita GDP for the sample of Mexican states is greater than 1 
for the whole period and reaches a peak of 1.57 in 2006.
19
 Other three countries like Argentina, 
Brazil and Peru display smaller disparities but they are still large compared to those found in 
other economies in the world. Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2004), for instance, compute the 
coefficient of variation for several developed countries, all of which are smaller than 0.30 in 
2000, while other developing countries like China and India, display a coefficient of variation of 
0.58 and 0.44, respectively. Bolivia is the country with the lowest fiscal disparities in the sample, 
but this result is partially explained by the high poverty rates present throughout the whole 
country. 
 
Table 2. Disparities in regional per capita GDP in five Latin American countries 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
         
Argentina         
max / min 7.89 8.10 8.79 8.14 7.94 7.84 -- -- 
coefficient of variation 0.70 0.69 0.84 0.77 0.76 0.77 -- -- 
         
Bolivia         
max / min 2.69 2.81 2.64 2.69 3.06 4.14 3.51 4.02 
coefficient of variation 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.55 
         
Brazil         
max / min -- -- 8.45 9.60 9.51 9.45 9.06 9.05 
coefficient of variation -- -- 0.44 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 
         
Mexico         
max / min 14.66 15.07 14.35 15.09 17.05 17.26 19.28 18.48 
coefficient of variation 1.14 1.17 1.16 1.24 1.40 1.40 1.57 1.40 
         
Peru         
max / min -- -- -- -- 10.89 11.29 12.25 11.37 
coefficient of variation -- -- -- -- 0.60 0.61 0.69 0.65 
         
Source: ECLAC, based on national official statistics.  
 
Per capita GDP can be expected to be negatively correlated with needs but positively 
with tax collection capacity. In that context, a sizeable and well designed equalization transfer 
program is particularly important to ensure that similar standards of quality and quantity in the 
provision of public goods are met nationally. In Latin America, however, the equalizing 
objective does not always play a significant role in the financing of sub-national governments. 
Table 3 presents the correlation between per capita GDP and per capita transfers received from 
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 The coefficient of variation is computed as the ratio between the standard deviation and the simple average of per 
capita GDP. 
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revenue sharing schemes and other transfer programs for the same group of countries. In 
Argentina virtually all transfers to the intermediate level of government are provided through 
revenue sharing mechanisms; and the positive correlation between this revenue source and 
regional GDP suggest that the overall transfer system has an unequalizing outcome. In Brazil 
revenue sharing transfers display a negative sign since 2003, implying that they are benefiting 
more those states with low per capita GDP. That is the intended role of those transfers in Brazil, 
which, as we saw above, are set as fixed proportions favoring the poorer macro-regions of the 
country. In contrast, other transfers in that country appear to be positively correlated with per 
capita GDP, suggesting poor equalizing effects in terms of per capita GDP. In Mexico and Peru 
the two transfer aggregates also show a positive and high correlation, although the transfers 
different from revenue sharing –those with equalization criteria– display a lower unequalizing 
effect. 
 
Table 3. Correlation between regional per capita GDP and transfers to the regions in five Latin 
American countries 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
         
Argentina         
GDP – revenue sharing 0.23 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.25 0.23 -- -- 
         
Bolivia         
GDP – revenue sharing -- 0.71 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.76 0.68 0.71 
         
Brazil         
GDP – revenue sharing -- -- 0.03 -0.22 -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 -0.31 
GDP – other transfers -- -- -0.17 0.06 0.41 0.35 0.39 0.40 
         
Mexico         
GDP – revenue sharing 0.51 0.57 0.46 0.58 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.57 
GDP – other transfers 0.23 0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.02 0.14 0.18 0.20 
         
Peru         
GDP – revenue sharing -- -- -- -- 0.19 0.72 0.79 0.80 
GDP – other transfers -- -- -- -- 0.31 0.50 0.38 0.07 
         
Source: Own computations based on ECLAC data. 
Notes: For Argentina all transfers to provincial governments are considered as shared revenues. Revenues shared in 
Bolivia consist of royalties and taxes applied on the exploitation of natural resources. Brazilian revenue sharing 
transfers are computed as the participation on the federal revenues plus the compensation for the exploitation of 
natural resources. In the case of Mexico, the revenues shared are given by the “participaciones” and the other 
transfers by the “aportaciones,” which are generally defined as conditional transfers. Revenue sharing transfers in 
Peru consist of canon, sobrecanon and mining royalties, all of them defined over the corporate income tax on 
extractive industries. 
 
The results in Table 3 are suggestive but much more data based evidence would be 
necessary in order to assess the overall equalizing effects of intergovernmental transfer programs 
currently implemented in Latin America. Per capita GDP might be related with the fiscal 
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capacity of sub-national governments, but that is not necessarily the case nor is it entirely clear 
how per capita GDP might be related with the needs for sub-national public services.  
With the limited data available, a complementary way to evaluate the equalizing effects 
of the intergovernmental transfer programs is to verify whether they have served to reduce the 
variability of per capita sub-national revenues. In Table 4 we present a set of basic statistics 
about per capita revenues at the municipal level in Peru during 2008. Some municipalities collect 
no revenues, but there is one municipality (Santa Maria del Mar, in Lima) that collects US$ 
930.3 per capita. The simple and weighted averages for the 1,834 municipalities are US$14.6 and 
US$31.4, respectively, and the coefficient of variation is 1.6, which suggests that the variability 
of own revenue collections among Peruvian municipalities in rather high. The second column 
describes the distribution of transfers different from the equalization program, including those 
from revenue sharing schemes. The total amount of these transfers is more than twice the amount 
of own revenues, and with the simple average larger than the weighted average, it is implied that 
less populated municipalities tend to receive higher transfers per capita. Again, there are some 
municipalities that receive no transfers, but others receive substantial amounts, mainly from the 
canon, sobrecanon and mining royalties which, as explained above, are distributed on a 
derivation basis. Note that the greatest amount of per capita transfers received by a municipality, 
US$8,520.3 –transferred to the municipality of Ilabaya in Tacna, is 68 times greater than average 
per capita (total) revenues in the country, equal to US$123.9. The coefficient of variation for 
these transfers is 5.5, indicating huge differences in the allocation of transfers across 
municipalities. 
 
Table 4. Variability of per capita revenues in Peruvian municipalities, 2008 (in US dollars) (*)
 
 
Own 
revenues 
Transfers 
other than 
equalization 
Total revenues 
minus  
Equalization 
transfers 
Equalization 
transfers 
Total 
revenues 
 (1) (2) (1)+(2) (3) (1)+(2)+(3) 
simple average 14.6 125.8 140.5 46.3 186.7 
weighted average 31.4 64.0 95.3 28.5 123.9 
minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 19.9 
maximum 930.3 8,520.3 9,158.1 448.1 9,184.4 
standard deviation 48.8 350.4 370.0 42.9 374.5 
coefficient of variation (**) 1.6 5.5 3.9 1.5 3.0 
count 1,834 1,834 1,834 1,834 1,834 
Source: Own computations based on data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Peru. 
(*) 1 US dollar = 2.87885 nuevos soles. 
(**) The coefficient of variation is computed as the ratio between the standard deviation and the weighted average. 
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Even though we are not considering local expenditure needs in these calculations, it is 
safe to conclude that transfers (other than those for equalization) are creating major horizontal 
imbalances at the local level in Peru. The total amount of municipal revenues minus the 
equalization transfer has a coefficient of variation equal to 3.9, which is very large under any 
standard. On the other hand, equalization transfers (distributed through the program 
FONCOMUN) also display a relevant degree of variability, but that variability seems to be 
helping to reduce horizontal disparities, given that the coefficient of variation is falling from 3.9 
to 3.0. In any case, either because of its limited size or problems with its design (distribution 
criteria, etc.), horizontal disparities remain very large and the equalization program has had a 
limited equalizing effect in that country. Note that the minimum amount of per capita 
equalization transfers is greater than zero, which implies that even those municipalities receiving 
disproportionate amounts of resources from the revenue sharing scheme are defined as 
beneficiaries of the equalization transfer program.
20
 
The case of Peru is not representative of all countries in the region, but there are some 
common aspects that deserved to be emphasized. Latin American countries often understand the 
fiscal decentralization system itself simply as the sharing of central government revenues, 
without requiring the additional revenues to be properly linked to the level and type of sub-
national public expenditures (Martinez-Vazquez, 2010).  
In general, the excessive reliance on revenue sharing and the corresponding small share 
of own sub-national revenue collections have led to limited accountability and to a soft budget 
constraint problem in the region (Ahmad and Brosio, 20042008). In order to solve this problem 
we suggest strengthening the link between revenues and expenditure by implementing 
equalization transfer programs that are capable of correcting the marginal cost of funds faced by 
the sub-national governments. This solution must be accompanied with the introduction of 
adequate measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, as well as with initiatives to 
improve own revenue collections in the region.
21
 In addition, revenues shared on a derivation 
basis should be reduced to a magnitude at which they do not prevent the equalization transfer 
system of correcting the marginal cost of public funds faced by the sub-national governments.  
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 Of course, the equalizing effect of the program could easily be increased by excluding these municipalities from 
its benefits, but this has not been done yet. 
21
 A natural consequence of incorporating fiscal capacity into the equalization formula would be that those sub-
national governments better able to cover their expenditure needs would be excluded from the benefits of the 
program. This means that the available funds can reduce horizontal imbalances more effectively because more 
resources would be available to the jurisdictions with greater fiscal disparities. 
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4. The Architecture of an Ideal Intergovernmental Transfer 
System  
A sound financial structure at the sub-national level is essential for the success of the fiscal 
decentralization process. Unfortunately, despite extensive international practice and academic 
research on this issue, it is still unclear what the ideal structure of the intergovernmental transfer 
system should be. In this section we review the basic principles for structuring the 
intergovernmental transfer system and take a look at very simple alternatives to implement an 
efficient and fair sub-national fiscal structure. 
There are different types of intergovernmental transfers available to policy makers, but 
the proper choice is necessarily linked to the specific objectives that are being pursued. The 
literature distinguishes several possible objectives, among which the followings may be the most 
important:
22
 
 reducing vertical imbalances; 
 ensuring national standards of certain public goods and services; 
 financing development programs; 
 correcting for positive and negative externalities; 
 reducing horizontal imbalances; 
 enhancing fiscal autonomy. 
Provided that sub-national governments are generally not able to collect by themselves all 
the funds required to fulfill their expenditure responsibilities, any transfer from the central 
government to the sub-national governments helps reduce any existing vertical imbalance. The 
main questions on this regard are: (1) what is the size of the vertical imbalance; and (2) to what 
extent the country is willing and able to close that imbalance.
23
 Once the total amount of funds 
available for intergovernmental transfers has been determined, the specific allocation criteria can 
be chosen in accordance with the other objectives that are going to be pursued. Each policy 
objective can better be served with certain types of intergovernmental transfers, and it is usually 
recommendable to use a separate transfer program to pursue each single objective. This allows 
for clarity of purpose and design and facilitates the evaluation of particular transfer programs. 
                                                          
22
 The literature on intergovernmental transfers is extensive. Introductory expositions can be found, for instance, in 
Bahl and Linn (1994), Bird and Smart (2002), Schroeder and Smoke (2003), Boadway (2007) and Martinez-
Vazquez and Searle (2007). 
23
 There is no single best way to measure vertical imbalance, but most of the measures used look at what share of 
sub-national government responsibilities cannot be financed with own revenues. Clearly, how well the vertical 
imbalance is close depends on how the expenditure needs of sub-national governments are defined. For a given set 
of expenditure standards, the country may be willing or able to satisfy only a part or all of those expenditure needs. 
The lower the standards defined for the expenditure needs the easier becomes to close the vertical imbalance. Thus 
the existence and measurement of vertical imbalance depend critically on the quantification of expenditure needs 
and the extent of revenue autonomy at the sub-national level.  
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One of the most important objectives of intergovernmental transfer programs is to ensure 
that minimum quantity and/or quality standards are met across the national territory. This 
objective is very broad and it implies that sub-national governments may not be given full 
discretion over expenditure decisions. In this sense, we can think of minimum standard 
requirements as a way to define delegated or non-discretionary responsibilities –or non-
discretionary components within certain responsibilities, as opposed to own responsibilities 
where the sub-national governments enjoy full autonomy or discretion over expenditure 
decisions.
24
 In other words, these transfers may be conditional in nature. There are many possible 
examples, but two especially important cases are transfers for education and health, where the 
central government usually set national standards and retains a great deal of control over sub-
national expenditures decisions. Other examples are the transfer programs for supporting 
pregnant women, children at risk, and the elderly. 
Development programs can have national or sub-national scope, depending on the design 
of the development strategy. Transfers in support of this objective are usually conditional to be 
spent in capital expenditures, but can plausibly be given for current expenditures as well.
25
 The 
theoretical literature gives especial importance to the role of correcting externalities. Additional 
transfers, plausibly determined through matching schemes, can help to encourage greater 
expenditures of sub-national governments in those functions with positive externalities outside 
the borders of sub-national jurisdictions. 
Once all revenue sources have been determined and the central government has 
transferred the resources necessary to attain national standards and development goals, then 
governments of the same level will most surely display significant differences in financing 
abilities. These differences are referred to as horizontal imbalances, and are addressed through 
equalization transfers programs. Presuming that the central government has provided the funds 
necessary to fund all delegated functions, the need for equalization is fundamentally related to 
the financing of own expenditure functions. As a consequence, equalization transfers should 
serve to enhance sub-national fiscal autonomy, and thus they usually are defined as 
unconditional. Fiscal autonomy is a necessary condition for efficient sub-national decisions, and 
because of that reason it is by itself considered as an objective of the transfer program. Provided 
that there is some degree of tax autonomy, with a sizable unconditional equalization program in 
place, however, there is no need for any other transfer program to pursue the objective of fiscal 
autonomy.  
All in all, the design of the transfer system can roughly be organized in four types of 
transfers to be applied sequentially. First, the central government should attempt to provide 
conditional transfers in amounts close to the cost of delegated functions, such that national 
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 In some countries the minimum standards are notional (as opposed to compulsory) and they are only employed for 
budgetary computations. For instance, minimum standards can be implicitly defined in the estimation of expenditure 
needs in an equalization formula, and sub-national governments can employ the received funds without any 
conditionality. This is the practice, for example, in Ukraine (Martinez-Vazquez and Thirsk, forthcoming.)   
25
 Searle and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) offer an extensive discussion on conditional or tied grants. 
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standards of quality and quantity can be met by all sub-national governments. Second, a different 
program of conditional transfers could be set in order to finance development programs, either of 
regional scope or as a part of local development initiatives. Third, matching grants, which are 
essentially conditional, could be provided in order to foster expenditures in socially desirable and 
sensitive services, including those with positive externalities.
26
 Forth, the equalization transfer 
program based on differences in expenditure needs and fiscal capacity acts as the balancing 
instrument for the whole system of sub-national revenues. If defined as unconditional it allows 
for adjusting the amounts of discretionary expenditures; while the precise amount given to each 
sub-national government also helps bring the cost of public funds faced by each jurisdiction 
closer to the optimal level. 
These transfers can be defined separately for any level of sub-national government and 
for both current and capital expenditures. Of course, limiting the use of transfers to capital 
purposes makes them conditional, but such a broad limitation might still leave room for 
autonomous choices as well as for additional conditions in terms of specific functions and 
services (Herrero-Alcalde et al., 2010). Note that from a theoretical viewpoint, revenue sharing 
schemes are simply not necessary, and that the only key components of the transfer system are 
the conditional transfers and the equalization program. Indeed, absent externalities it is possible 
to think of a situation where only these two types of programs provide all the funds that sub-
national governments require in addition to their own revenue collections.  
 
The architecture of equalization transfer programs  
Bahl and Bird (2008) argue that an intergovernmental transfer system capable of 
offsetting the dis-equalizing effects of sub-national taxation is a precondition for a successful 
decentralization of significant revenue raising powers. This is largely a non-controversial issue in 
the design of decentralized systems; however, most countries in Latin American do not have an 
equalization program in place, and the existing equalization mechanisms usually have very 
limited equalizing power. In the following discussion we briefly describe some of the most 
important concepts related with the design and implementation of an effective equalization 
transfer program.  
Equalization transfers are intended to provide sub-national governments of the same level 
with similar opportunities to deliver public goods and services of comparable quality in spite of 
their dissimilar conditions. On the one hand, some of the dissimilar conditions can be observed 
on the expenditure side of the budget. Different governments are faced with different costs and 
even production functions, as well as with different needs of the population arising, for example, 
from age composition. The concept summarizing these factors is called expenditure needs, 
defined as the cost of providing a standard amount and quantity of public goods and services to 
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 Creating disincentives for certain expenditures with negative externalities would require economic sanctions, 
which might be implemented, for instance, as a reduction of equalization transfers. 
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the local community. On the other hand, on the revenue side of the budget governments are faced 
with different administration capacity, tax bases, compliance culture and behavioral responses to 
taxation. These factors determine that jurisdictions can differ in their ability to collect revenues 
to cover their expenditure needs. In this context, fiscal capacity can be defined as the ability of a 
government to collect revenues from the assigned sources at a given marginal cost or level of 
fiscal effort. 
The difference between expenditure needs (EN) and fiscal capacity (FC) is equal to what 
in the literature has been called fiscal disparity (FD): 
FDi = ENi – FCi , 
where the subscript i denotes any jurisdiction.
27
 If the fiscal disparity of jurisdiction i is positive 
(negative) then its government has, under standard conditions, less (more) funds than required in 
order to cover its expenditure needs. In this context, horizontal imbalances might be defined as 
the differences in per capita fiscal disparities across jurisdictions, and the objective of the 
equalization transfer problem is the reduction of those differences.
28
 In practice, however, 
equalization transfer programs around the world vary in terms of what their objective is (see 
Table 5). In some cases the equalization is based only on expenditure needs; in others only on 
fiscal capacity; and there are also many examples where both factors are considered. 
 
Table 5. Equalization Goals, Allocation Factors and International Practice 
Goals Factors Country examples 
Enable similar levels of 
service affordability 
Expenditure needs indicators, or 
national expenditure standards  
India, Italy, Nigeria‟s Federation 
Account, South Africa‟s Equitable 
Shares, Spain, Uganda‟s 
Unconditional Grant  
Enable similar levels of 
fiscal resource availability 
Fiscal capacity indicators  Canada‟s Equalization Grant 
 
Enable similar levels of 
service at similar levels of 
taxation 
Fiscal disparity = Expenditure 
needs – Fiscal capacity, or some 
other combination of need and 
capacity 
Australia, China Germany, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Netherlands‟ Municipal Fund,  
Russia, Uganda‟s Equalization 
Grant, United Kingdom 
 
Source: Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007). 
 
By considering exclusively either expenditure needs or fiscal capacity one would 
implicitly assume that the other factor does not significantly vary across jurisdictions. This could 
plausibly be true; but it does not seem to be the case in Latin American countries where regional 
inequalities are pronounced and in most cases arising (to different extents) from both sides of the 
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 Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) and Dafflon (2007) provide surveys on alternative definitions of fiscal 
disparity, most of which are directly related with the concept of expenditure needs, fiscal capacity, or their 
combination. 
28
 Fiscal disparities are more easily defined in per capita terms for comparability purposes. 
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budget. Moreover, since one additional monetary unit of expenditure needs is equivalent to one 
monetary unit loss of fiscal capacity, then it is correct to consider both factors as equally 
important. 
The implementation of an equalization transfer program can be structured in three steps. 
First, it is necessary to determine the size of the transfer fund. The total amount of equalization 
transfers should be, in principle, related to the excess of expenditure needs over potential 
revenues different from the equalization transfer itself. In practice, however, the size of the 
transfer fund depends more generally on the chosen funding system,
29
 the availability of 
financial resources at the national level, and on political constraints. Although some countries 
attempt to almost fully equalize horizontal disparities (for example, Germany), typically the 
overall funds made available are insufficient to fully eliminate existing fiscal disparities.  
The second step consists of estimating relative fiscal disparities. It is usually not possible 
to accurately compute the actual fiscal disparity of each sub-national government. Instead, and 
depending on the quality of the information available, a country can rely on a number of 
methodologies to estimate expenditure needs and fiscal capacity in relative terms for all sub-
national governments.
30
 In general, it is not recommendable to base the estimation of fiscal 
disparities on historical data related to actual spending and revenues. On the one hand, historical 
budgets might have been poorly assigned, and thus not associated with efficient fiscal decisions. 
On the other hand, doing this would provide perverse incentives because sub-national authorities 
would easily learn to spend more and collect less in order to increase transfers in the future. 
There are several methodologies available for estimating expenditure needs; 
unfortunately, the most attractive options are also the most information intensive and require data 
that are usually unavailable in developing countries. A feasible and effective option may be the 
computation of per client expenditure norms adjusted for cost differences across jurisdictions. 
Under this methodology we only need to determine the total amount of resources to be spent in 
the most important sub-national functions or programs, and then compute the norm by dividing 
this amount by the total number of clients that are intended to receive the benefits of the 
program. The expenditure norm might be adjusted to reflect costs differences across 
jurisdictions, and it corresponds to a nationwide per client expenditure need. The client-based 
expenditure norm may have a prescriptive or suggestive character, but in any case it facilitates 
the national debate about fiscal policy reforms. 
 The estimation of fiscal capacity determines how much revenue each government can 
raise from its own sources with a standard level of tax effort (and allowing for all other transfers 
received different from equalization). When sub-national governments have some degree of 
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 The funding rule could be a revenue sharing scheme or left as an ad hoc decision to be determined in the annual 
national budget. Predictable and stable sources of revenues are preferable because they provide more certainty for 
sub-national budgets. 
30
 A revision of the methodologies described in the literature can be found in Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007). 
See also U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1986, 1990, 1993) for more detailed 
discussions on fiscal capacity estimations. 
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discretion over tax sources, the standard level of effort is sometimes represented by the effective 
tax rate, defined as the ratio of revenue collections over the tax base. In general, however, what 
matters in not only the tax rate but the marginal collection costs faced by each local government. 
From an optimal taxation perspective, and in order to minimize the costs of tax system, the 
marginal cost of public funds collected must be equalized across all governments of the same 
level. Moreover, since the resultant measure of fiscal capacity is based on equal conditions for all 
sub-national governments of the same level, then it can be considered as both fair and efficient.  
In practice, however, the estimation of fiscal capacity in developing countries is very 
challenging due to limited data availability. There are methodologies, like the representative tax 
system, that provide appropriate approximations to fiscal capacity, but the data requirements may 
be out of reach for most Latin American countries.
31
 More practical solutions might be to 
consider, at least temporarily while the information systems are developed, either averages of 
historical collections, or proxies for the size of the tax bases assigned to the sub-national 
governments. The first of this alternatives in not ideal because historical revenues might not be 
obtained under fairly equal and efficient conditions, but at least the use of an average of several 
years would reduce the perverse incentives on revenues and expenditure decisions. The second 
methodology is preferable, but good proxies such as the GDP in the jurisdiction are usually 
unavailable. The implementation of this methodology might be more feasible in a second stage 
of the reform, when more and better data is available for sub-national governments. 
The third step in the implementation of an equalization transfer program is to compute 
the amount of transfers to be assigned to each sub-national government. If the fiscal disparity of 
a government is positive then its expenditure needs exceed its fiscal capacity and a transfer will 
be necessary in order to improve its fiscal situation. On the contrary, if the result is negative then 
the municipality will have more resources than it needs (according to the established standards) 
and no transfer will be justified. Excluding those sub-national governments with negative fiscal 
disparities from the benefits of the equalization transfer program is a simple and effective way to 
improve the equalizing power of the equalization transfer program.
32
 Equalization transfers can 
be assigned simply in proportion to the size of the positive fiscal disparities, or prioritizing the 
governments with the greatest fiscal disparity per capita.  
Finally, it is important to note that equalization transfers are not necessarily restricted to 
current expenditures. The expenditure responsibilities assigned to sub-national government 
require both current and capital expenditures, and as such autonomous efficient decisions over a 
flow of capital financing might also result in economic gains from greater allocation efficiency. 
This is a rather unexplored topic in the literature, and where international experience is still not 
developed. A good example is given by the Regional Compensation Fund, the equalization 
                                                          
31
 A description of this methodology can be found, for instance, in U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (1993).  
32
 Under a “fraternal” (or Robin Hood) system like the one used in Chile the pool of funds would be fed with 
contributions from those jurisdictions with negative fiscal disparities. This is a way to perform faster equalization 
across jurisdictions but is not always politically acceptable. 
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transfer program for capital expenditures at the regional level in Peru. In reality, however, the 
implementation of this program is more an attempt to constraint the use of the equalization funds 
than an innovative solution to the problems of improving equity and efficiency. Indeed, in Peru 
regional governments do not receive unconditional equalization transfers; and at the local level 
the governments are not given equalization transfers for capital spending. 
In a recent paper, Herrero-Alcalde et al. (2010) suggest a methodology for a new capital 
transfer program for Spanish autonomous communities, where a portion of the transfer is given 
with the objective of equalizing the ability of governments to regularly improve and maintain 
their stock of capital, and another portion is meant to offset historical differences in the 
accumulated stock of capital. This is a new area of research that offers alternatives to 
decentralized countries to improve the allocation of the available funds among sub-national 
governments for capital investment purposes. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Latin American countries have for long been involved in fiscal decentralization reforms, but in 
general they have not yet come up with efficient arrangements for sub-national government 
financing. Some of the main problems in the region are the excessive dependency on revenue 
sharing arrangements, poor revenue collection performance at the sub-national levels, and 
inadequate or unimportant equalization schemes. This situation has weakened the accountability 
mechanisms and the perceived linkages between tax and expenditure decisions, preventing the 
governments and constituencies of facing the incentives they need in order to behave efficiently 
in a fiscally decentralized system of government.  
The fiscal decentralization literature describes some of the necessary conditions for a well 
functioning sub-national fiscal structure, but it is rather ambiguous regarding its composition and 
the extent to which revenue sharing schemes might be used without distorting the incentives 
faced by sub-national governments. In this paper we provide a novel analysis of the problem and 
conclude that revenue sharing should be used, if at all, to finance only non-discretionary (or 
delegated) expenditures functions. Own (discretionary) expenditure functions, in contrast, should 
be associated with an efficient (positive) marginal cost of public funds, which can plausibly be 
set in a combination of own revenue collections and a well designed equalization transfer 
program. 
Our analysis suggests that Latin American countries might significantly improve their 
decentralization systems by reducing their reliance on revenue sharing schemes and expanding 
and improving the design of sizable equalization transfer programs. These programs can help 
reduce horizontal imbalances and, when combined with significant own revenue autonomy, 
provide sub-national governments with the right incentives to spend efficiently and develop their 
own tax collection capacity.  
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This paper also provides general guidelines on how to proceed with the design and 
implementation of equalization transfers systems in Latin American countries. Sophisticated 
methodologies for the computation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity might not be feasible 
due to limited data availability, but useful good alternatives exist that can be readily 
implemented in the region.  
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